We study an aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. The binary case of this problem, where only two positions are allowed on each issue, is by now quite well understood. We consider arbitrary sets of conceivable positions on each issue. This general framework admits the modeling of aggregation of various types of evaluations, including: assignments of candidates to jobs, choice functions from sets of alternatives, judgments in many-valued logic, probability estimates for events, etc. We require that the aggregation be performed issueby-issue, and that the social position on each issue be supported by at least one member of the society. The set of feasible evaluations is called an impossibility domain if these requirements are satisfied for it only by dictatorial aggregation; that is to say, if it gives rise to an analogue of Arrow's impossibility theorem for preference aggregation. We obtain a two-part sufficient condition for an impossibility domain, and show that the major part is a necessary condition. For the ternary case, where three positions are allowed on each issue, we get a full characterization of impossibility domains.
Introduction
There is, by now, a significant body of literature on the problem of aggregating bi- evaluations in X must be dictatorial (we call a set X for which this holds an impossibility domain). In [6] we gave a full answer: X is an impossibility domain if and only if it is totally blocked 1 and is not an affine subspace of {0, 1} m .
In the present paper, we extend the binary framework by allowing more than two positions on each issue. Instead of {0, 1}, we have an arbitrary set P of conceivable positions on each issue. The prescribed set of feasible evaluations is now a subset X of P m . We present a number of examples that naturally fit this framework.
Example A: Assignments. Suppose that there is a certain number m of available jobs, and a pool P of candidates who can fulfill any of those jobs. The natural feasibility constraint is that no candidate can be assigned to more than one job. This is reflected by the subset X of P m consisting of all m-tuples with pairwise distinct entries. Further constraints may apply, leading to smaller sets of feasible assignments. Considering an appointments committee in this situation, the question is how to aggregate the feasible assignments suggested by the individual committee members into a feasible assignment adopted by the committee.
Example B: Choice functions. We refer to a situation considered in classical social choice theory, where P is a set of alternatives, and a family of m subsets P 1 , . . . , P m of P is given (often this is the family of all non-empty subsets of P , but in general a subset of P appears among the P j if it may become the set of available alternatives).
The choice function of a decision maker specifies, for each P j , his preferred element when facing a choice from P j . The set of all choice functions may be viewed as the subset P 1 × · · · × P m of P m . The set of feasible choice functions X is in general a subset of P 1 × · · · × P m , reflecting constraints that one wishes to impose, for example rationalizability. The question that we ask here is how to aggregate the feasible choice functions of the individual decision makers into a feasible choice function for the society. Example D: Probabilities. Suppose that a panel of experts needs to evaluate the probability of each of m given events in a certain sample space. Here P is the interval [0, 1], and X is the subset of P m containing those probability evaluations of the m events that are feasible, namely, compatible with the axioms of probability.
The question is how to aggregate the feasible probability evaluations submitted by the individual experts into a feasible probability evaluation adopted by the panel.
We are interested in aggregators f : X n → X that satisfy properties analogous to those considered in the binary case. The IIA property extends naturally to the non-binary case. It requires that the social position on any given issue should depend only on the individual positions on that same issue (the acronym is better interpreted as Issue-by-Issue Aggregation). This is admittedly a strong requirement, but we observe that the non-binary framework allows us to weaken its bite when it is deemed too strong. Suppose, for example, that we face a binary evaluation problem, but we deem a certain triple of issues to be relevant to each other, so that the social position on each of them should be allowed to depend on the individual positions on all three of them. Then we can re-model the problem by combining the three issues into one composite issue admitting 2 This illustrates why we should be interested in the aggregation of non-binary evaluations, even if the original issues are binary in nature.
Regarding the Pareto property, there are two non-equivalent ways to extend it to the non-binary case. We say that f is Paretian if, whenever all individuals hold the same position on an issue, the society adopts that position. We say that f is supportive if, on any issue, the social position is one of the positions held by the individuals on that issue; in other words, the social position on any issue must have the support of at least one individual. Note that while the two properties coincide in the binary case, in general the latter is stronger than the former. Both require respecting unanimity, but supportiveness also requires that a unanimously rejected position be rejected by the society. The appeal of supportiveness depends on whether or not the set of positions P has additional structure that the aggregator may reasonably exploit. Thus, in Examples C and D above, where the elements form a scale, supportiveness is unattractive (in particular, in the probabilities example it rules out taking the average of the individual evaluations as the aggregate evaluation).
But in examples such as A and B above, where there is no natural order on the elements of P , supportiveness makes a lot of sense. In the present paper we focus on IIA and supportive aggregators, and thus our results are interesting mainly for applications in which the set of positions P has no inner structure. We leave the study of aggregation under the weaker Pareto property for separate research. 2 More generally, such re-modeling can handle in a satisfactory way any situation in which the relevance relation among the original issues is an equivalence relation. For a treatment that stays within the binary framework, but can handle any relevance relation, see Dietrich [2] . For models that require IIA only on some issues, see Mongin [12] and Dietrich and Mongin [5] .
We call the set X of feasible evaluations an impossibility domain if any IIA and supportive aggregator f : X n → X must be dictatorial. The main question that we address in the non-binary case is what structural conditions on X make it an impossibility domain. In Theorem 1 we give two such conditions which together are sufficient for X to be an impossibility domain. The first of them is total blockedness, adapted in a non-trivial way from the binary case. The second condition is that X should be multiply constrained; this is a mild condition that requires the existence of some constraint on feasibility that involves more than two issues. Comparing this pair of conditions with the two conditions in our earlier result for the binary case, we note two differences: (a) The condition of multiple constrainedness did not appear in the binary case result (although it was used in its proof), due to the fact that it is a consequence of total blockedness in the binary case (but not in the general case).
(b) On the other hand, no analogue of the non-affineness condition is needed in the non-binary case; indeed, its role in the binary case was to guarantee the monotonicity of the aggregator, which in the non-binary case follows (in a non-trivial way) from our other assumptions. As an application of Theorem 1, we obtain a general impossibility result for aggregating assignments (Example A).
Theorem 2 is a partial converse of Theorem 1. It asserts that total blockedness is a necessary condition for X to be an impossibility domain. In other words, if X is not totally blocked then there do exist IIA and supportive aggregators f : X n → X which are not dictatorial; in fact, we show their existence for any n ≥ 2. The situation regarding the condition of multiple constrainedness is more complex: examples show that it is not a necessary condition for X to be an impossibility domain, but it cannot be entirely removed from Theorem 1 without hindering sufficiency. Still, as the condition of multiple constrainedness is mild and is satisfied in most of the interesting applications, the gap between our sufficient conditions for impossibility and our necessary condition for it may be considered to be small. We do close this remaining gap in the ternary case, that is, when only three positions are allowed on each issue. Theorem 3 gives a full characterization in the ternary case: X is an impossibility domain if and only if it is totally blocked and it is either multiply constrained or exclusive. The latter condition requires the existence of an issue k, so that for each of the three positions on k there exists a position on another issue which is incompatible with it but is compatible with the other two positions on k. This may be understood as identifying a type of forbidden configuration, the existence of which characterizes impossibility in the case left open by the earlier conditions. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model formally, state the general Theorems 1 and 2, and illustrate them with some examples. The two theorems are proved in Section 3. We state and prove Theorem 3 on the ternary case in Section 4.
We conclude the introduction with a brief survey of relevant literature, emphasizing contributions to the non-binary case. Arrow's [1] celebrated impossibility theorem showed that in the problem of preference aggregation, the IIA and Pareto properties force the aggregator to be dictatorial when at least three alternatives are present.
Wilson [18] introduced an abstract model of aggregation of binary evaluations, and showed that Arrow's theorem applies not only to preference aggregation but also to other aggregation problems satisfying certain conditions. Rubinstein and Fishburn [15] extended Wilson's model to allow non-binary evaluations, as we do here.
However, their approach was algebraic, and this led them to assume that the set of positions is a field; no algebraic structure plays a role in our treatment. Both Wilson and Rubinstein-Fishburn raised the question of characterizing impossibility domains, but their results gave only sufficient conditions for impossibility to hold, which were far from necessary.
Kalai [10] proposed a different way to generalize Arrow's theorem. In his approach, the objects to be aggregated are choice functions, in the sense explained in Example B above (note that when the subsets from which choices are made are all pairs of alternatives, and the feasible choice functions are the rationalizable ones, this is equivalent to standard preference aggregation). He made a conjecture that extends Arrow's theorem by considering choice functions from subsets of arbitrary size (thus, non-binary), and any class of feasible choice functions which is symmetric with respect to the alternatives. Kalai's conjecture was proved, under a certain restriction on the subset size, by Shelah [16] . Their model is a special case of ours.
The rich recent literature on judgment aggregation, starting from the first impossibility theorem of List and Pettit [11] , dealt mostly with sets of propositions in a two-valued logic (corresponding to binary evaluations). Pauly and van Hees [14] and van Hees [17] did obtain impossibility theorems for judgment aggregation in many-valued logic, in the sense explained in Example C above. But these results were confined to some specific logics and to agendas satisfying certain richness conditions, making their set-up much more special than ours. Gärdenfors [8] and Dietrich and List [4] dealt with incomplete judgment sets in two-valued logic, which is equivalent to allowing three positions (true/false/abstain) on each proposition, as modeled by us in [7] . But in these models the primitive notion of consistency or feasibility is in a binary setting, and the feasibility of three-valued evaluations is derived from it, not exogenously given as in the present paper.
Finally, the aggregation of probability evaluations in the sense explained in Example D above has been studied in the statistics literature, mostly under the assumption that the probabilities of all events in the sample space need to be evaluated; see a survey by Genest and Zidek [9] . Recently, inspired by the judgment aggregation model, Dietrich and List [3] offered a treatment of probability aggregation with an arbitrary family of events to be evaluated.
The model and the general results
We consider a finite, non-empty set of issues J. The projection of the set X on the j-th coordinate is denoted by X j , and its elements are referred to as the feasible positions on issue j. Note that there is no loss of generality in using the same set P of conceivable positions for all issues, as the subsets X j ⊆ P of feasible positions may differ across issues. We say that X is binary if |X j | ≤ 2 for every j ∈ J, and non-binary otherwise.
A society is a finite, non-empty set N of individuals. For convenience, if there are n individuals in N , we identify N with the set {1, . . . , n}. If we specify a feasible
we obtain a profile of 3 Our impossibility results extend in a straightforward way to a model with infinitely-many issues. The possibility results require compactness in the following sense: every infeasible evaluation has a restriction to a finite set of issues which is infeasible (i.e., cannot be completed to a feasible evaluation). issue. Viewing profiles as matrices, this says that the aggregation is done columnby-column. As we shall deal with IIA aggregators, we will slightly abuse notation and write also expressions of the form f j (x j ), where
is the column vector of individual positions on issue j. That is, we will treat f j also as mapping
This means that the social position on any issue must be one of the individual positions on that issue.
. That is to say, the society always adopts the dictator's evaluation. A dictatorial aggregator is trivially IIA and supportive.
We say that X is an impossibility domain if for every society N , every IIA and supportive aggregator for N over X is dictatorial. Otherwise we say that X is a possibility domain. By this definition, X is a possibility domain if for some n there exists a non-dictatorial IIA and supportive aggregator f : X n → X. It will turn out, however, that in this case such aggregators exist for all n ≥ 3 (and sometimes also for n = 2). 4 Note that in the binary case supportiveness is equivalent to the Pareto property, which requires that f j (u, . . . , u) = u for every j ∈ J and every u ∈ X j . But in the general case supportiveness is stronger. We observe that both properties may be defined more generally for any aggregator, not necessarily IIA, by global conditions that refer to the entire profile. Thus f is Paretian if we have f (x) = x whenever the profile x is such that x i = x for all i ∈ N ; and f is supportive if we have
These are conceptually less demanding definitions which, in the presence of IIA, yield the issue-by-issue definitions given above.
Our aim is to find structural conditions on the set X that can be used to classify it as a possibility or an impossibility domain. We start by introducing some terminology and tools that will be used to describe the structure of X. Note that X is a subset of the Cartesian product m j=1 X j , and we may assume that |X j | ≥ 2 for all j (an issue j with |X j | = 1 may be discarded without affecting the problem). A sub-box is a subset B of m j=1 X j of the form B = m j=1 B j , where B j ⊆ X j for each j. We call such B a 2-sub-box if |B j | = 2 for each j. The set X induces a set of feasible evaluations in each sub-box B, namely the set X ∩ B. When B is a 2-sub-box, this puts us in a setting that is isomorphic to the binary case of our problem. We will exploit this to lift known concepts from the binary case to the general case. These concepts are originally due, in the binary case, to Nehring and Puppe [13] , but we follow and adapt the terminology we introduced in [6] .
Let X be a subset of P m , let B be a fixed sub-box, and let K be a subset of J. A K-evaluation within B is a vector x = (x j ) j∈K ∈ j∈K B j ; this is a partial evaluation assigning values to issues in K only, and lying in the corresponding projection of B.
Such x is said to be feasible within B if it can be completed (by assigning values also to issues in J \ K) to an evaluation in X ∩ B; otherwise, it is infeasible within B.
A minimally infeasible partial evaluation within B (abbreviated B-MIPE) is a vector
x = (x j ) j∈K ∈ j∈K B j that is infeasible within B, but such that every restriction of x to a proper subset of K is feasible within B. The B-MIPEs are thus the minimal obstacles to feasibility within B. We will also use the above terminology without specifying a sub-box B, when we refer to the whole box, that is, B = m j=1 X j . Our first condition on X will be expressed in terms of a directed graph G X associated with X, that we proceed to define. The vertices of G X are labeled by the triples uu j , where j ∈ J and u, u ∈ X j , u = u . Thus we have and similarly for u on k and v on . 5 We write uu k →→ vv if there exists a directed path in G X from uu k to vv . Finally, we say that X is totally blocked if G X is strongly connected, that is, for any two vertices uu k and vv we have uu k →→ vv .
The length of a B-MIPE x = (x j ) j∈K is |K|. We say that X is multiply constrained if there exists a sub-box B for which there exists a B-MIPE of length at least 3.
We are now ready to state our two general results, providing sufficient and necessary conditions, respectively, for X to be an impossibility domain. Proof. Clearly, X j = P for all j ∈ J, so X is non-binary. For any k, ∈ J, k = , and any u, v, w ∈ P , v = u = w, we have uv k → wu . Indeed, there exist
we can take B to be a 2-sub-box that contains y and z and x = (x k , x ) to be the B-MIPE with x k = x = u, to witness that uv k → wu . Using this fact repeatedly, we show that X is totally blocked. Indeed, it suffices to show that uu k →→ vv for any two vertices with k = . If u = v this holds in one step, and otherwise taking j ∈ J \ {k, } we have uu k → v u j → vv . Next, we check that X is multiply constrained by taking four distinct elements t, u, v, w of P and considering the sub-box it does in fact hold true more generally for all p ≥ m such that p ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2. We omit the proof of this fact, which uses ideas that will be developed in Section 4. This fact shows, in particular, that unlike total blockedness, multiple constrainedness is not a necessary condition for an impossibility domain.
Next we apply Theorem 2 to a special case of the problem of judgment aggregation in many-valued logic presented in Example C. Recall that in the introduction we pointed out that supportiveness may be too strong a requirement in the context of this problem. But here we obtain a possibility result, which is only strengthened by our use of supportiveness rather than the plain Pareto property. 
Note that any feasible evaluation with a 0 entry must have at least two 0 entries; and conversely, any evaluation with at least two 0 entries is feasible, except (0, 0, x 3 ) with x 3 = 0. It follows that G X does not contain any arc from a vertex of the form 0u k to one of the form vw with v = 0. Indeed, such an arc would require the existence of an infeasible evaluation with x k = 0, x = w that becomes feasible upon replacing w by v = 0, which is impossible by the above. Thus X is not totally blocked and hence, by Theorem 2, it is a possibility domain. This can also be verified directly, by noting that the 'least-belief' rule x j = min{x i j | i ∈ N } for j = 1, 2, 3 yields an aggregator with the required properties.
Our last example in this section will show that the assumption of multiple constrainedness, although not a necessary condition for impossibility, cannot be entirely dropped from Theorem 1 without losing sufficiency. In other words, there do exist non-binary totally blocked possibility domains. 3 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Winning coalitions and 2-neutrality
Throughout the proof of Theorem 1, we consider an IIA and supportive aggregator f : X n → X. In each step of the proof, we will establish properties of f , using some of the conditions on X assumed in the theorem and/or some of the properties of f established earlier (the conditions and properties used in each step will be stated explicitly). Eventually we will show that f is dictatorial.
We consider the components f j of f . Given the IIA property, each f j will be viewed as mapping columns of positions on issue j, of the form
Several of the properties of f will be expressed in terms of the behavior of the f j on columns that consist of at most 2 different positions. This behavior is captured by the collections of winning coalitions defined as follows. For an issue j and an ordered pair of distinct positions u, u ∈ X j , we say that a subset S of N is a uu j -winning coalition if . In Table 1 we construct a profile of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation, all restricted to issues in K (for ease of exposition, we assume that K = {1, . . . , r} and k = 1, = 2).
TABLE 1
Construction for Lemma 1
The fact that uu 1 → B,x,K vv 2 implies that each of the rows corresponding to S and N \ S in the table is feasible within B, i.e., may be completed to an evaluation in
As f is supportive, the resulting social evaluation must also lie in X ∩ B.
However, by our assumptions on S and supportiveness, the social positions on issues in K are as indicated in the table, and thus coincide with x, which is infeasible within
B.
Proposition 1 If X is totally blocked then f is 2-neutral.
Proof. By repeated applications of Lemma 1, it follows that uu k →→ vv implies
. Therefore, if X is totally blocked then all the collections of winning coalitions coincide.
Establishing 2-monotonicity
We say that f is 2-monotone if each of the collections W 
Proposition 2 If X is non-binary and totally blocked then f is 2-monotone.
Proof. By Proposition 1, f is 2-neutral. The failure of 2-monotonicity can then be stated as the existence of S ⊂ T such that S ∈ W, T / ∈ W; or equivalently, the existence of a partition
. We fix such a partition and work towards a contradiction. For any j ∈ J and any (a, b, c) ∈ X 3 j , the value assumed by f j on the column in which the members of S 1 hold position a, those of S 2 hold position b, and those of S 3 hold position c, will be denoted (by a slight abuse of notation) f j (a, b, c) . We need the following lemma. Table 2 a profile of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation that we denote by
TABLE 2
First construction for Lemma 2
The social position on issue 1 is determined by an assumption of the lemma. We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that s 2 = y 2 , and hence by supportiveness s 2 ∈ {v, v }. Using now s as the third row, we construct in Table 3 another profile of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation that we denote by t = (t 1 , . . . , t m ) ∈ X.
TABLE 3
Second construction for Lemma 2
For j = 3, . . . , r we have t j = s j for the following reason: if s j = y j then column j is the same as in Table 2 , and otherwise by supportiveness s j = x j and t j = x j .
Regarding s 2 and t 2 we have two cases. In the first case, s 2 = v and therefore, since S 2 ∈ W, t 2 = v . In this case we use t as the second row and s as the third, constructing in Table 4 yet another profile of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation that we denote by w = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) ∈ X.
TABLE 4
Third construction for Lemma 2
The social positions on issues 1, . . . , r are implied by our assumptions that
we have w j = z j ∈ B j . If t j = s j , this means that the column j outcomes in Tables 2 and 3 differ, which must be because s j = y j . By supportiveness, this implies that s j ∈ {z j , z j }, which implies that t j ∈ {z j , z j }, which in turn implies that w j ∈ {z j , z j } ⊆ B j . It follows that w ∈ X ∩ B, contradicting the fact that x is a B-MIPE with x 1 = u, x 2 = v .
In the remaining case, s 2 = v and therefore, since S 1 ∈ W, t 2 = v. In this case, we redo the construction in Table 4 with the roles of s and t interchanged, and reach the same contradiction.
Returning to the proof of Proposition 2, we treat now the following case.
Since X is totally blocked, we have ab j →→ ac j . We fix y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ X with y j = c, and apply Lemma 2 repeatedly along a path in G X from ab j to ac j .
The initial assumption that f j (a, b, c) = c carries over along the path to the final conclusion that f j (a, c, c) = c. However, the latter contradicts the fact that S 1 ∈ W.
Note that if S 3 ∈ W then S 1 , S 2 , S 3 play symmetric roles in our assumptions.
The fact that X is non-binary means that there exist j ∈ J and pairwise distinct a, b, c ∈ X j , and so the assumption of Case 1 holds without loss of generality. Thus we may assume that S 3 / ∈ W. This implies that whenever a, b, c ∈ X j are not pairwise distinct, we have f j (a, b, c) ∈ {a, b}. Therefore, in negating Case 1 we can refer to all, not necessarily pairwise distinct triples, getting the following.
Case 2. For all j ∈ J and all a, b, c ∈ X j we have f j (a, b, c) ∈ {a, b}.
Now we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Assume Case 2 holds, and let
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider again the construction in Table 2 , with resulting social evaluation s = (s 1 , . . . , s m ) ∈ X. By our current assumption, s 1 = u. We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that s 2 = v. By the Case 2 assumption, this implies that s 2 = v . The same assumption implies that s j = x j for j = 3, . . . , r and
, m. This contradicts the fact that x is a B-MIPE.
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 2 by treating the remaining Case 2.
We fix any j ∈ J and distinct a, b ∈ X j , and some y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ X with y j = b.
We apply Lemma 3 repeatedly along a path in G X from ab j to ba j . Initially we have f j (a, b, b) = a because S 1 ∈ W, and this carries over along the path to yield finally
However, the latter contradicts the fact that S 2 ∈ W.
Establishing 2-decomposability
Assume that f is 2-neutral. We say that f is 2-decomposable if for every U ∈ W and every partition S, T of U we have either S ∈ W or T ∈ W.
Proposition 3 If X is multiply constrained and f is 2-neutral then f is 2-decomposable.
Proof. Let B be a sub-box and x = (x j ) j∈K be a B-MIPE with |K| ≥ 3. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that S, T / ∈ W, S ∩ T = ∅, and U = S ∪ T ∈ W. Now, consider the construction in Table 5 (where for ease of exposition K = {1, . . . , r}).
TABLE 5
Construction for Proposition 3
The fact that x is a B-MIPE guarantees that for j = 1, 2, 3 there exists x j ∈ B j so that the j-th row in the table is feasible within B. However, by our assumptions on S, T , and U and supportiveness, the resulting social positions coincide with x, which is infeasible within B.
Establishing 2-dictatorship
We say that f is 2-dictatorial if there exists an individual d ∈ N so that each of the
This means that d prevails on any issue when the individuals hold at most 2 distinct positions on that issue.
Proposition 4 If f is 2-neutral, 2-monotone, and 2-decomposable, then it is 2-

dictatorial.
Proof. Let U be a winning coalition of minimum cardinality (this is well defined because N ∈ W). If |U | ≥ 2 then we get a contradiction to minimality by using 2-decomposability. Clearly |U | = 0 is impossible since ∅ / ∈ W. Hence there exists
and the reverse inclusion follows by duality.
From 2-dictatorship to dictatorship
Proposition 5 If X is totally blocked and f is 2-dictatorial then f is dictatorial.
Proof. Let d be the 2-dictator for f . Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that d is not a dictator for f . Then there exists at least one instance of p ∈ J and 
Lemma 4 Let y
Proof of Lemma 4 .
vv for a suitable 2-sub-box B and a
For ease of exposition, we assume that K = {1, . . . , r} and
. , r, and there exists
. . , r. Using these two evaluations and the q − 2 fixed evaluations in the statement of the lemma, we construct in Table 6 a profile of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation that we denote by
TABLE 6
First construction for Lemma 4
The social position on issue 1 is determined by an assumption of the lemma, and those on issues 3, . . . , r by the existence of repeated values in those columns (which forces the outcome to be the position of S 2 ). We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that s 2 = v. Using now s as the first row, we construct in Table 7 another profile of feasible evaluations and the resulting social evaluation that we denote by t = (t 1 , . . . , t m ) ∈ X.
TABLE 7
Second construction for Lemma 4
The social position on issue 2 is v because we assume s 2 = v and hence, by supportiveness, s 2 is one of the other values in that column. For j = r + 1, . . . , m we have t j ∈ B j . Indeed, if s j = z j then column j is the same in both tables, and therefore t j = s j = z j ∈ B j . Otherwise, s j is one of the other values in that column, and hence t j = z j ∈ B j . It follows that t ∈ X ∩ B, contradicting the fact that x is a
B-MIPE.
Returning to the proof of Proposition 5, we recall that for a particular p ∈ J and Since the latter q-tuple contains repeated values, this is a contradiction.
Taken together, Propositions 1-5 yield a proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
We assume that X is not totally blocked. Hence there exists a partition of the vertices of G X into two non-empty parts V 1 and V 2 so that there is no arc in G X from a vertex in V 1 to a vertex in V 2 . For n ≥ 2, we define a non-dictatorial IIA and supportive aggregator f : X n → X component-by-component as follows:
We only need to show that f = ( , which are in X ∩ B). By the above definition, we must have
) , which contradicts our assumption about V 1 and V 2 .
The ternary case
The set X of feasible evaluations is ternary if max j∈J |X j | = 3. In the current section we deal with this case, and obtain a full characterization of impossibility domains. The condition on X that we need for the characterization of impossibility domains will require the existence of a certain type of configuration in the compatibility graph H X . Let k be an issue with |X k | = 3. We say that a vertex u k is excluded by another Before proving Theorem 3, we illustrate it with two examples of ternary sets X.
Each of them is totally blocked and not multiply constrained, and is therefore not settled by Theorems 1 and 2. The condition of exclusivity distinguishes between them and classifies them as an impossibility and a possibility domain, respectively. However, X is not multiply constrained: a B-MIPE of length 3 would be some
x ∈ B \ X, and so it would have two equal entries, which would be infeasible by themselves. The set X is exclusive because every u k is excluded by u for = k. It follows from Theorem 3 that X is an impossibility domain. To verify that X is totally blocked, we observe that the following is a Hamiltonian cycle in G X :
To check that X is not multiply constrained, we note that an infeasible x ∈ {0, 1, 2} 
Proof of Theorem 3: sufficiency
The only part of the proof of Theorem 1 that used multiple constrainedness is Proposition 3. The following substitute for Proposition 3 will therefore yield a proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 3.
Proposition 6
If X is exclusive and f is 2-neutral then f is 2-decomposable.
Proof. Let k be an issue with
The failure of 2-decomposability can be stated as the existence of disjoint S, T / ∈ W so that S ∪ T ∈ W; or equivalently, the existence of a partition S 1 , S 2 , S 3 of N with
. We fix such a partition and apply f k to the column in which the members of S 1 hold position u, those of S 2 hold position u , and those of S 3 hold position u . We assume that the value of f k on this column is u (this is without loss of generality, due to the symmetry in our assumptions). Let u k be excluded by v . Consider the construction in Table 8 .
TABLE 8
Construction for Proposition 6
The row corresponding to S 1 in the table is feasible for some v ∈ X , because u ∈ X k . The rows corresponding to S 2 and S 3 are feasible because u k ∼ v and u k ∼ v . The indicated social positions follow from our assumptions and yield a contradiction to u k v .
As a side remark, we point out that Proposition 6 is not specific to the ternary case. For the general case, we define X to be exclusive if there exist an issue k and a
Proposition 6 remains true, with the same proof, and so the sufficiency part of Theorem 3 holds true for any non-binary X. 6 It is the necessity part that depends crucially on X being ternary.
Proof of Theorem 3: necessity
The necessity of total blockedness was already proved (for the general case) in Theorem 2. Thus, the following proposition will complete the proof of Theorem 3. Proof. We assume that n is odd (otherwise we can replace N in the following by an odd cardinality subset). We say that a column (x we must have u k ∼ v , a contradiction. On the other hand, if H k X has no perfect matching then it must have two vertices so that every edge is incident to at least one of them (this follows from König's duality theorem, and may also be verified directly for a 3-by-3 bipartite graph). This implies that the union of the support sets corresponding to these two vertices is N . Hence at least one of these two support sets must be a majority, contradicting the Case 3 assumption.
It remains to show that z = (z 1 , . . . , z m ) may be chosen so that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. It will be convenient to use the following notation for k ∈ J 3 :
We will need the following lemma. Note that if w j is compatible with a vertex in H k X , and that vertex is incident to only one edge in H k X , then w j must be compatible also with the other end of that edge (to see this, consider a feasible evaluation that includes w j and the vertex it is known to be compatible with). Using this, we conclude that u k w j , u k ∼ w j , u k ∼ w j , so u k is also excluded by w j . This contradicts our assumption that u k ∈ F k . A similar argument shows that u k ∈ F k . So the four vertices u k , u k , v , v are in F k and F respectively.
Regarding u k and v we distinguish two cases. If u k ∼ v then u k ∈ E k and v ∈ E because they are excluded by v and u k , respectively. If u k v then arguments similar to the above show that either u k ∈ E k and v ∈ E or u k ∈ F k and v ∈ F . In any case, we see that every edge of H k X either has its two ends in F k and F , or it has them in E k and E .
Returning to the proof of Proposition 7, we introduce an auxiliary graph Γ. The vertex set of Γ is J 3 , and vertices k, ∈ J 3 , k = , are joined by an (undirected) edge in Γ if k, satisfy the premises of Lemma 5. For each connected component C of Γ we proceed as follows. We choose an arbitrary vertex p of C and some u ∈ X p so that u p ∈ F p (this is possible because we assume that X is not exclusive). Then we choose some x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ X so that x p = u. For each vertex j of C we assign the corresponding default to be z j = x j . Doing this separately for each connected component of Γ, we determine all entries of z = (z 1 , . . . , z m ) corresponding to issues in J 3 .
We check that Condition 1 is satisfied by working within each connected component C of Γ. Given any vertex j of C, we apply Lemma 5 repeatedly along a path in Γ from p to j. According to the initial choice we have x p ∈ F p , and this carries over along the path to yield x j ∈ F j . Hence z j = x j is not excluded. Now suppose that Condition 2 is violated for k, ∈ J 3 , k = . This means that k, is matchable but z k z . By Condition 1 we have z k ∈ F k and z ∈ F . Thus k, satisfy the premises of Lemma 5, and are therefore joined by an edge in Γ. Hence z k = x k and z = x are compatible, contradicting our assumption that they are not.
